We present a family of protocols for flipping a coin over a telephone in a quantum mechanical setting. The family contains protocols with n + 2 messages for all n > 1, and asymptotically achieves a bias of 0.192. The case n = 2 is equivalent to the protocol of Spekkens and Rudolph with bias 0.207, which was the best known protocol. The case n = 3 achieves a bias of 0.199, and n = 8 achieves a bias of 0.193. The analysis of the protocols uses Kitaev's description of coin-flipping as a semidefinite program. We construct an analytical solution to the dual problem which provides an upper bound on the amount that a party can cheat.
Introduction
Quantum coin-flipping is an attempt to solve the problem of coin-flipping by telephone [4] in a setting where the security is guaranteed purely by the laws of quantum mechanics.
A typical description of the problem is as follows: Alice and Bob have been collaborating via email and are about to publish. Given their notorious lack of surnames, they would like to flip a coin to determine whose name appears first on the paper. Unfortunately, though good collaborators, they don't completely trust each other, nor do they have a common acquaintance whom they both trust. Though they don't wish to meet in person, they do want to guarantee that the other person can't cheat and win the coin-toss with a probability greater than 1/2. Fortunately, they have at their disposal computers capable of sending and processing quantum email.
More specifically, quantum coin-flipping is a two party protocol involving a sequence of quantum messages between the parties, after which each party must output a classical bit. An output of zero will correspond to Alice winning whereas Bob will win on an output of one. The requirements of the protocol are as follows: (1) If both parties are honest then Alice's bit must be uniformly random, and it must always equal Bob's bit; (2) If Alice is honest, then independently of what Bob does, she will output one (i.e., Bob wins) with a probability no greater than P * B = 1 2 + B ; (3) If Bob is honest, then independently of Alice's actions, he will output zero with a probability no greater than P * A = 1 2 + A . We define the bias as = max( A , B ), which is the figure of merit for a coin-flipping protocol. In the ideal case we want = 0.
Note that no restriction is placed on the case when both players are dishonest. Nor are there any requirements that the outcomes agree when one party is cheating, which would be impossible to achieve. Furthermore, the protocol must start in an unentangled state, for if they could choose to start in an entangled state, the problem would be trivial.
Strictly speaking the above problem is given the name weak coin-flipping because a cheating party may opt to lose. For example, no restriction is placed on Bob's ability to force Alice to output zero. The case when neither party may bias the coin in either direction is called strong coinflipping.
Ambainis [1] and Spekkens and Rudolph [6] have constructed strong coin-flipping protocols with a bias of = 1 4 . It is also known that quantum strong coin-flipping protocols cannot achieve a bias smaller than = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2, as was proven by Kitaev [8] (and summarized in Ref. [3] ).
There is less known about weak coin-flipping. The best known protocol prior to the present paper is by Spekkens and Rudolph [7] and achieves a bias of = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 0.207 (previous protocols include Ref. [5] ). The best known lower bound is by Ambainis [1] and states that the number of rounds must grow at least as Ω(log log 1 ). In particular, this means that no protocol having a fixed number of rounds can achieve an arbitrarily small bias. Ambainis [2] also proves the optimality of Spekkens and Rudolph's protocol within a family of 3-message protocols.
It is likely that the bias achieved by Spekkens and Rudolph is optimal for any protocol involving three or less messages. However, as we shall show in this paper, a better bias can be achieved using more messages.
In particular, we shall describe in Section 2 a family of protocols, indexed by an integer n > 1, with n + 2 messages. The case of n = 2 with four messages will be equivalent to Spekkens and Rudolph's original protocol. The protocols with more rounds will achieve an even better bias.
The main result of this paper is the construction of quantum weak coin-flipping protocols which achieve a bias less than = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2. This excludes the possibility that Kitaev's bound for strong coin-flipping can be directly extended to weak coin-flipping, and establishes that it is not possible for the minimum bias of weak coin-flipping to equal that for strong coin-flipping in the context of quantum mechanics. We do not exclude the possibility, though, that a three message protocol, outside of the family analyzed by Spekkens and Rudolph, can achieve the optimal bias claimed by the present paper.
The main technique used in this paper is Kitaev's description of coin-flipping as a semidefinite program. This description provides a dual problem whose solutions bound the amount that a party may cheat. Though this material has been previously published, it will be reviewed in Section 3.
The main contribution of the present paper is in Section 4, where we shall construct solutions to the problem dual to the protocol of Section 2. These shall provide analytic upper bounds on the bias of the protocol.
Our protocol for a given n depends on n parameters subject to one constraint, and we shall express the upper bound as a function of these parameters. Any choice of the parameters, consistent with the constraint, will give a valid protocol together with an upper bound on its bias. To find good protocols with small bias, we shall use a numerical minimization over the space of parameters. This will be done in Section 5.
We stress, however, that given a set of values for the parameters, these can be put into the analytic expression to obtain a valid upper bound on the bias. The existence of weak coin-flipping protocols with the quoted biases does not depend in any way on the accuracy or quality of the numerical minimization.
Finally, the most interesting question is what happens in the limit n → ∞. We shall show that at least for some choices of the parameters, the bias does not converge to zero. In fact, it appears that most reasonable choices converge to the same point in this limit, which may indicate that this is the best bias that can be achieved by any quantum weak coin-flipping protocol.
The protocol
We shall describe a family of weak coin-flipping protocols, indexed by an integer n ≥ 2, which will involve n + 2 messages. The protocols will also depend on a set of pa-rameters a 1 , . . . , a n to be fixed later. These parameters define the two-qubit states |φ i = √ a i |00 + √ 1 − a i |11 . The protocol begins with Alice preparing in her private Hilbert space the states |φ i for odd i, while Bob prepares the states with even i in his Hilbert space. The first n messages of the protocol consist of sending halves of the states |φ i . More explicitly, the i th message involves the owner of state |φ i , who sends one of the two qubits comprising the state to the other party. After the first n messages, if both players were honest, the state of the system should be:
where the labels A, B denote the qubit's owner.
At this point each side will apply a two-outcome projective measurement {E 0 , E 1 } to their n qubits. These operators will be described below but will have the properties
These properties guarantee that when both parties are honest, their answers are perfectly correlated. We can therefore associate the outcome E 0 with an outcome of zero for the coin flip, and the outcome E 1 with coin outcome one. The requirement that the coin-flip be fair when both parties are honest ψ|E i ⊗ E i |ψ = 1/2 will impose a constraint on the parameters {a i }.
At this point both parties should know the "honest" outcome of the coin-flip. Now they enter a stage of cheat detection in which the loser will examine the qubits of the winner. If no cheating is detected (which is guaranteed when both players are honest) then the "honest" outcome becomes the final outcome. Otherwise, if the losing party detects cheating, that party may ignore the "honest" outcome and instead output his or her desired outcome (zero for Alice and one for Bob). This is acceptable because the rules of weak coinflipping don't require the parties to output the same bit when one party is dishonest.
We now describe the cheat detection stage which will involve the last two messages: the winner of the coin toss according to the measurement {E 0 , E 1 } sends over their entire Hilbert space for inspection. If Bob wins, he should send over his n qubits so that Alice obtains both halves of the state
This is a pure state, and Alice can perform a two outcome projection onto this state and its complement. If she obtains the complement as outcome, she knows Bob must have cheated. More specifically, define
Alice measures using the projections {F 1 , I − F 1 }, where outcome I − F 1 implies Bob has cheated. In the case when the honest outcome is zero, Bob does the equivalent steps with {F 0 , I − F 0 }.
Note that the order in which the last two messages are sent is irrelevant. The player sending message n could send at the same time his cheat detection message (if he lost), so that the protocol can be run with only n + 1 messages.
All that remains is to describe the projections E 0 and E 1 . Heuristically, the measurement consists of the following process: Examine the qubits in order starting from the one belonging to |φ n and ending with the one belonging to |φ 1 . The qubits are to be measured in the computational basis, until the first zero outcome is obtained, which implies that the sender of that qubit loses. If all qubits produce outcome one then Alice (being the first message sender) is the winner. Of course, the measurement is not performed in stages as described above but rather using the unique pair of projectors which produces the same distribution of probabilities. For example, for n = 2 we have E 0 = |00 00| + |10 10| + |11 11|, and E 1 = |01 01|, where the leftmost qubit corresponds to the first qubit sent or received.
The case of n = 2 is equivalent to the protocol described by Spekkens and Rudolph in Ref. [7] which achieves the tradeoff P * A P * B = 1/2.
Reformulation of the protocol
For the analysis in the following section, it will be helpful to delay all measurements to the last step, and to avoid the use of unitaries. This will be possible if we are willing to allow one side to have increased cheating power.
The idea is that the analysis of a coin-flipping protocol is divided into two separate steps: the analysis of Honest Alice vs Cheating Bob, and the analysis of Cheating Alice vs Honest Bob. Let us focus on the first case.
We wish to describe a new coin-flipping protocol, where Bob's ability to cheat is exactly the same as in the original protocol, but where Alice may be able to cheat more than usual. We shall call the original protocol P and the new protocol P . The idea is that P will be simpler to describe than P and since at the moment we are only concerned with bounding Bob's ability to cheat, any bound derived for one protocol will apply to the other.
The protocol P begins with the same initial state as P and the first n messages are identical. However, in P after the first n messages no measurements occur. Instead, Bob sends all of his n qubits to Alice. After this last message Alice performs the two-outcome projective measurement {F 1 , I −F 1 } as before and reports outcome F 1 as Bob winning and I − F 1 as Alice winning. In P Bob never outputs anything, as we are only concerned with Alice's output probabilities.
It is not hard to see that any cheating strategy for Bob that can be used in P will produce the same probability of winning in P , because the only thing that changed from Al-ice's perspective is that now she always expects to receive Bob's qubits. However, as protocol P was written, the only time that Bob could win was when he sent his qubits, so he loses nothing by always sending them. From a mathematical perspective, we are using the fact that
When analyzing the case of cheating Alice, P is no longer useful, but we can define a new protocol P in a similar way, where Alice always sends all her qubits to Bob. Protocol P can bound Alice's cheating power in P.
For the rest of this paper, we shall employ protocols P and P where appropriate without further comment. However, all bounds derived will apply to the original protocol P as well.
Coin-flipping as an SDP
The problem of finding the optimal cheating strategy for a player can be cast as a semidefinite program (SDP). The dual problem then provides bounds on the maximum bias that the cheating player may achieve. This approach was first described by Kitaev [8] (and summarized in Ref. [3] ).
In the following section we will review Kitaev's construction, though using a somewhat different language than the original. What few results are needed from the theory of semidefinite programming will be derived along the way in order to keep this paper as self contained as possible. The discussion in this section will be completely general in the sense that it applies to any coin-flipping protocol. The results obtained will be applied to our protocol in Section 4.
The primary problem
We shall focus on the case when Alice is honest and Bob is cheating. We will work with protocols that can be cast in the following form: The initial state is a fixed pure unentangled state shared by Alice and Bob. The protocol proceeds by applying unitaries on each individual side, and by sending qubits from Alice to Bob and vice-versa. In the last step, each party performs a two outcome projective measurement and outputs the result.
In fact, the communication part of the protocol (i.e., everything but the initial state preparation and the final measurement) can be described as a sequence of the following three elementary operations: one of Alice's qubits is sent to Bob, one of Bob's qubits is sent to Alice, or each side applies a unitary to their qubits.
Given a protocol, let m be the number of elementary steps, and let ρ 0 be the density matrix describing Alice's qubits in the first step. Let ρ i be the density matrix describing Alice's qubits after the first i elementary operations, given some cheating strategy for Bob. These matrices must satisfy the following equations:
• If step i involves sending qubit j from Alice to Bob then ρ i = Tr j ρ i−1 .
• If step i involves Alice receiving a qubit from Bob and assigning it name j then Tr j ρ i = ρ i−1 .
• If step i involves Alice applying unitary U i then ρ i = U i ρ i−1 U −1 i . It will be convenient to have a shorthand notation for these equations. They shall be written as
where L i and R i are linear operators corresponding to the identity, partial trace, or conjugation by a unitary as needed to match the above equations.
Clearly, no matter what Bob's strategy is, the above equations must be satisfied. Furthermore, because Alice's output probabilities are entirely determined by ρ m , a cheating strategy for Bob can be described in terms of the above sequence of density operators {ρ i }. In fact, it is not hard to see that by keeping the total state pure, Bob can make Alice have any sequence of density operators which are consistent with the above equations. Therefore, there is a oneto-one correspondence between cheating strategies of Bob (up to isomorphisms that produce the same result on Alice's side) and density operators ρ 0 , . . . , ρ m satisfying the above equations.
After the communication rounds have been completed, Alice makes a two-outcome projective measurement {E A , E B } to determine her output. Outcome E A will correspond to Alice winning (i.e., final outcome zero) and E B will correspond to to Bob winning (i.e., final outcome one).
Bob's goal is to choose a sequence of positive semidefinite operators ρ 1 , . . . , ρ m satisfying the above protocol dependent equations, in order to maximize Tr(E B ρ m ). Note that ρ 0 is always fixed by Alice's initial state, and the above equations fix the trace of the remaining matrices, therefore the maximization can indeed be done over all positive semidefinite matrices. We have proven: Lemma 1. The maximum probability of winning that can be attained by Bob through cheating in a coin-flipping protocol described by the data m, ρ 0 ,
The dual problem
The beauty of semidefinite programing is that each SDP has a dual SDP. When the original problem involves a maximization, the dual problem involves a minimization. Furthermore, the optimal solution of the dual problem will be greater than or equal to the optimal maximum of the original problem. In terms of coin-flipping each solution of the dual problem provides an upper bound on the amount that Bob can cheat.
The variables of a dual SDP are Lagrange multipliers, one for each constraint in the original problem. There are m equality constraints given by the m elementary operations of the protocol, therefore there will be m Lagrange multipliers Z 1 , . . . , Z m . Each Z i will be a Hermitian matrix of the same dimension as L i (ρ i ) and will be added in as a term of the form
We will now lift the conditions L i (ρ i ) = R i (ρ i−1 ) on the operators {ρ i } allowing them to vary freely. The constraints will be dynamically imposed by the Lagrange multiplier terms. However, because the traces of {ρ i } are no longer fixed we shall impose the constraints ρ i ≤ I so as to keep the expression Tr E B ρ m finite. We now have:
where max is taken over 0 ≤ ρ 1 , . . . , ρ m ≤ I and sup and inf are taken over Hermitian matrices Z 1 , . . . , Z m . We used the shorthand notation 
where the identity is inserted into the empty slot of qubit j. The expressions for L d i are defined similarly. For compactness we
because under these constraints the second term is guaranteed to be non-positive for any set of {ρ i }. We have proven:
, and ρ 0 are data associated with a coin-flipping protocol. The maximum probability that Bob can win such a coin-flip by cheating is bounded by P * B ≤ Tr[Z 1 R 1 (ρ 0 )]. Our goal in the next section will be to guess sets of matrices Z 1 , . . . , Z m satisfying the inequalities, and try to find a set that produces a good bound on P * B without worrying whether the bound is optimal.
Finding solutions to the dual problem
Continuing the analysis of the case where Alice is honest and Bob is cheating, we need to find the problem dual to P . The protocol P can be thought of as having m = n + 1 elementary operations if we relax the definition somewhat to allow the receiving of n qubits in the last message as one step. Each elementary step consists of either sending or receiving a message, and unitaries are never used. The final measurement is done with
It will be useful to define a specific ordering for the qubits in Alice's Hilbert space. The intuition is to picture qubits as carried by particles in a lattice. When played honestly, the initial state will be prepared on 2n particles, some of which will be controlled by Alice, and some by Bob. Sending a qubit from Alice to Bob simply means that the particle will now be controlled by Bob rather than Alice. Alice's full Hilbert space at each step will be the ordered tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of all particles she controls in that step. Note that this does not restrict the power of cheater, who could have as many extra qubits as he wants that can interact with any particle under his control.
The ordering of the states will be as follows. The initial state is prepared so that |φ i is carried by particles i and n + i. This is depicted in Fig. 1 .
The first steps involve Alice sending qubit n + 1, then receiving qubit 2, then sending qubit n + 3, and so on. At the end of the first n messages Alice will control the first n qubits. The last step involves Alice taking possession of the other n qubits.
With these conventions, the primal problem reads:
plus one final equation Tr n+1,...,2n ρ n+1 = ρ n . With these conventions the dual problem involves finding m = n + 1 Hermitian matrices Z 1 , . . . , Z n+1 . They must satisfy the following equations:
for odd i ≤ n, (6) Z i ⊗ I i ≥ Z i+1 ⊗ I n+i+1 for even i < n, (7) where the subscript on the qubit identity matrices indicate into which slot it should be inserted. If n is even, we also need Z n ⊗ I n ≥ Z n+1 . Finally, in addition to the previous n inequalities we need to satisfy
where the identity is inserted into the slot of the last n qubits. The goal is to choose the matrices in order to mini-
To minimize this quantity, it is clearly to our advantage to choose the Z i matrices as small as possible in a sense to be discussed below. In particular, the optimal choice for Z 1 is simply to satisfy the equality Z 1 = Z 2 . We can remove Z 1 from our equations and write
where |ϕ 3 = |φ 3 ⊗ |φ 5 ⊗ · · · , and Tr a1 denotes a weighted partial trace on the first qubit with weights a 1 and 1 − a 1 . For example, when acting on a matrix that only involves the first qubit
Note that in a slight abuse of notation, the subscript 1 in Tr a1 indicates both which a i is used, and on which qubit the partial trace is performed. The next inequality, which reads Z 2 ⊗I 2 ≥ Z 3 ⊗I n+3 , is harder to satisfy, and in general equality cannot be achieved. However, we don't need to pay much attention to what happens in the subspace orthogonal to |ϕ 3 , and we can in a sense sacrifice this subspace in order to obtain small entries in the subspace that we are interested in.
More specifically, let T 3 be the partial trace
where the trace is taken only over qubits that are involved in |ϕ 3 , that is, qubits 3, n + 3, 5, n + 5, and so on. The equation
, which is an equation involving only the first two qubits. We will begin by finding the optimal choice in this subspace. Let us assume that T 3 (Z 3 ⊗ I n+3 ) is a diagonal matrix with entries x 00 , x 01 , x 10 , x 11 . We want to choose T 3 (Z 2 ⊗ I 2 ) to be as small as possible while still satisfying the inequality. However, because of the linearity of T 3 , the matrix
(12) where M 0 , M 1 are the diagonal entries of M in the computational basis, and M c is the complex off-diagonal entry.
Since we are trying to minimize ϕ 3 | Tr a1 Z 2 |ϕ 3 = Tr a1 M , the best choice is to take M 0 = max(x 00 , x 01 ), M 1 = max(x 10 , x 11 ) and M c = 0 which clearly satisfies the inequality. Notice that the maximum is taken over pairs of eigenvalues whose computational basis eigenvectors differ only in the second qubit. Symbolically, we shall write this as M = max
where the operator max is defined only for diagonal matrices. The subscript 2 specifies that the maximum is to be taken over subspaces that differ in the second qubit.
The above discussion is only valid when T 3 (Z 3 ⊗ I n+3 ) is diagonal, but we can impose this constraint on Z 3 (and the equivalent constraint on future Z i ), which is acceptable because we are only looking for a solution of the inequalities, even if it is not the optimal solution. Now if we could choose Z 2 to satisfy the full inequality, and still satisfy T 3 (Z 2 ) = M for the matrix chosen above we would have
The following lemma shows that it is possible to choose Z 2 so that we can get arbitrarily close to the above result. Because we will use β to upper bound P * B , it doesn't matter if it is an infimum, and therefore we can use the lemma to eliminate Z 2 in favor of the above expression. (15) which uses the partial trace T 5 with |ϕ 5 = |φ 5 ⊗ |φ 7 · · · .
Using the lemma again we eliminate Z 4 in favor of Z 5 :
where the expression is only valid if T 5 (Z 5 ⊗ I n+5 ) is diagonal in the computational basis (which will force T 3 (Z 3 ⊗ I n+3 ) to be diagonal as well). One may worry that repeated uses of the lemma will make Z 3 have arbitrarily large entries which means that the lemma can no longer be used to eliminate Z 2 . But the problems can be eliminated by taking the limits in the proper order, or more appropriately, by making sure that the coefficient y associated with Z 2 is much larger than the one associated with Z 4 which in turn needs to be much larger than the one associated with Z 6 and so on.
The process is repeated until in the last step, when n is odd, the innermost expression is of the form T n (Z n ⊗ I 2n ) = T n (Z n+1 ⊗ I 2n ) = Tr an Z n+1 , yielding
When n is even, we had the special inequality Z n ⊗ I n ≥ Z n+1 which is satisfied by choosing Z n = max n [Z n+1 ], so that we get the same alternating expression, with the innermost operation a max:
Both of these formulas are valid only if Z n+1 is diagonal in the computational basis, which will make all the matrices of the form T i (Z i ) for odd i diagonal as well.
We are now left with the task of minimizing β as a function of Z n+1 with the constraint that Z n+1 must be real and diagonal in the computational basis and must satisfy the inequality Z n+1 ⊗ I ≥ F 1 .
In fact, when Z n+1 is diagonal the inequality can be simplified further. In the qubit ordering we have chosen, the final state of the protocol right before measurement should β a1 max max a3 a3 a3 a3 be |ψ = |φ 1 1,n+1 ⊗ |φ 2 2,n+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φ n n,2n where we have explicitly listed the location of each qubit. Therefore F 1 = 2E 1 ⊗ E 1 |ψ ψ|E 1 ⊗ E 1 has support only on the 2 n dimensional subspace spanned by states where qubits i and i + n are equal for all i. The constraint Z n+1 ⊗ I ≥ F 1 need only be checked in this subspace where it takes the
and |ξ B = √ 2E 1 |ξ .
Example n = 3
We shall use the case n = 3 as an example. Let Z 4 = diag(x 0 , 0, x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , 0, x 6 , 0), where the top row corresponds to |000 , the second one to |001 and so on. The entries along the diagonal of Z 4 outside of the support of |ξ B ξ B | have already been set to zero, which should be expected for all optimal solutions. Otherwise, any set of {x i } that satisfies Z 4 ≥ |ξ B ξ B | is a valid solution of the dual problem. The corresponding bound can be calculated from these variables using Eqs. (17) or equivalently by evaluating the tree depicted in Fig. 2 .
The tree is evaluated as follows: each node has a value that is either the maximum or the weighted sum of the nodes below it. The weighted sum is just a i times the value of the left descendant plus 1 − a i times the value of the right descendant. The value of the root node corresponds to β and is an upper bound on P * B . We shall call trees of this form Sum-Max trees.
Sum-Max trees appear naturally when analyzing classical protocols for coin-flipping. The basic idea is that these protocols can be described as a sequence of public random bits, with the first one announced by Alice, then the second one by Bob and so on. At the end both parties look at the sequence of bits and determine the outcome of the coin-flip. The whole protocol can be described as a binary tree, with Alice's bits choosing the path at the odd depth nodes and Bob's bits controlling the rest.
A player attempting to cheat in such a protocol will not output random bits but will instead choose the path that maximizes his chances of winning at each node. If we put ones and zeros in the leaf nodes corresponding to a win or loss, the maximum probability with which the cheater can win is given by evaluating the corresponding Sum-Max tree.
If we ignore the cheat detection stage in the protocol, then it can be described completely classically. Its Sum-Max tree would be the same as Fig. 2 , except that all the variables would be replaced by the number one. This can easily be seen from our formalism, because the only effect of removing the last round is to force Z n+1 to equal E 1 which is diagonal with ones in place of the variables {x i }.
It is well known that in the classical case, one party can always fully bias the coin in their favor. However, in the quantum case with cheat detection, because the leaves of Sum-Max tree are less restricted, there is the possibility of obtaining a stronger bound on the amount of cheating.
The analysis so far has been of the case when Alice is honest and Bob is cheating. The case of Bob honest and Alice cheating is almost identical, though. The main difference is that this case has to be analyzed from Bob's perspective, so that the odd messages consist of receiving a qubit and the even ones involve sending a qubit. This has the effect of switching sums with maxes and vice versa. The optimal Z 4 for this case will also have support in the complementary space.
Finding the optimal Z n+1
Returning to the case of honest Alice, we need to finish the general case by choosing a matrix Z n+1 in order to obtain an expression for β in terms of the parameters a 1 , . . . , a n . Recall that we have restricted our analysis to matrices Z n+1 that are diagonal in the computational basis. We shall now search for the minimum value of β consistent with this choice. Let x 1 , . . . , x 2 n be the diagonal entries of Z n+1 . We will, as in the example above, set the variables to zero when their corresponding basis vector is orthogonal to |ξ B , which will leave around half of the variables. We also wish to work in the subspace where the two values entering a max node in the Sum-Max tree are equal. For example, this is the space consistent with a 3 x 0 = a 3 x 2 + (1 − a 3 )x 3 and x 4 = x 6 in the example above. The only potential problem exists at the lowest level of max nodes, where a zero can be entering the node. For the following we will assume that n is odd which eliminates this problem. The even case will be derived from the odd case below.
Working in this subspace we can replace all the maximums with weighted sums with any weight of our choice.
In this situation, β can be calculated as a weighted trace of Z n+1 . That is, there exist diagonal matrices W such that β = Tr(Z n+1 W ) for any Z n+1 in this subspace. For example, a valid choice for W is the diagonal part of |ξ ξ|, which replaces the max nodes at each level i by the weighted sum using a i . That is Tr[Z n+1 diag(|ξ ξ|)] = Tr a1 Tr a2 Tr a3 · · · Tr an Z n+1 .
(20) This will turn out to be the wrong choice for W but it gets us closer to the following lemma: Lemma 4. Let |Ψ be a state, not necessarily normalized, and let D be the diagonal part of |Ψ Ψ|. Let E = E 2 be a diagonal projector. The minimum of Tr(ZD) over diagonal real matrices Z, subject to the constraint Z ≥ 2E|Ψ Ψ|E, is given by 2| Ψ|E|Ψ | 2 and is attained by
Proof. Because Z is diagonal we can write Tr(ZD) as Ψ|Z|Ψ . Clearly if Z ≥ 2E|Ψ Ψ|E then Tr(ZD) = Ψ|Z|Ψ ≥ 2| Ψ|E|Ψ | 2 . It is also attainable using Z = 2 Ψ|E|Ψ E which satisfies the inequality constraint because by Cauchy-Schwarz Φ|E|Ψ Ψ|E|Φ ≤ Ψ|E|Ψ Φ|E|Φ for any |Φ .
Because |ξ B ξ B | = 2E 1 |ξ ξ|E 1 , we are almost in the situation covered by the above lemma. Unfortunately, we are only maximizing over the space consistent with the entries to every max node being equal (while keeping the zero entries in Z n+1 equal to zero), so in general Z n+1 proportional to E 1 is not a valid solution. However, by rescaling the variables, we can get to the situation where this subspace contains E 1 , and the above lemma is useful.
More specifically, let S be a diagonal positive ma-
We would like to choose S so that Z n+1 = E 1 is a valid solution, that is, when Z n+1 = √ S −1 E 1 √ S −1 = S −1 E 1 is put into the Sum-Max tree, the pair of values entering each max node are equal. We also need to define W as the diagonal part of S|ξ ξ|S. For this to be valid, we must show that we can compute β as a function of Z n+1 by the expression Tr(Z n+1 W ) for every Z n+1 consistent with the original requirements. If these two conditions are satisfied, though, then the lemma tells us that β = 2 | ξ|SE 1 |ξ | 2 ,
where we used the fact that both S and E 1 are diagonal in the computational basis. We begin by analyzing as an example the case of n = 3 depicted in Fig. 2 . Define e i = i|E 1 |i which takes the values zero or one. Similarly, let s i = i|S|i . We construct S so that s 0 = s 1 = σ 0 σ 0L , s 2 = s 3 = σ 0 σ 0R , s 4 = s 5 = σ 1 σ 1L , s 6 = s 7 = σ 1 σ 1R . The factors σ 0 , σ 0L , and σ 0R should be thought of as being associated with the left max node. The first one is a normalization factor, and the other two will be used to balance the values of the left and right descendants. Similarly, the other three variables are associated with the right max node.
To satisfy the first constraint, we set Z n+1 = S −1 E 1 , or equivalently, x i = s −1 i e i . Note that the e i factor will force the appropriate x i variables to be zero. We focus on the left max node. The value entering through the left descendant is
whereas entering on the right side is
For the two values to be equal, we can choose σ 0L = a 3 e 0 + (1 − a 3 )e 1 and σ 0R = a 3 e 2 + (1 − a 3 )e 3 . Similarly, the constraint at the other max node can me met by choosing σ 1L = a 3 e 4 + (1 − a 3 )e 5 and σ 1R = a 3 e 6 + (1 − a 3 )e 7 . Now we need to check the constraint on W = diag(S|ξ ξ|S). Now Tr(Z n+1 W ) can be described as the Max-Sum tree in Fig. 2 , with the max nodes replaced by sums. Focusing again on the left max node, it adds a 2 σ 2 0 σ 2 0L of its left descendant plus (1 − a 2 )σ 2 0 σ 2 0R of the right descendant. We need these quantities to sum to one, and therefore σ 0 = [a 2 σ 2 0L + (1 − a 2 )σ 2 0R ] −1/2 . Similarly, we choose σ 1 = [a 2 σ 2 1L + (1 − a 2 )σ 2 1R ] −1/2 to normalize the sum replacing the right max node. Now we can finally evaluate β = 2 | ξ|SE 1 |ξ | 2 . This can also be represented by a tree similar to the tree in Fig. 2 , with the max nodes replaced by different sums as follows: the left max evaluates to a 2 σ 0 σ 0L times the input from the left plus (1 − a 2 )σ 0 σ 0R times the right input. But the left and right inputs are respectively equal to a 3 e 0 + (1 − a 3 )e 1 = σ 0L and a 3 e 2 + (1 − a 3 )e 3 = σ 0R , so the node evaluates to
which is the weighted root mean square of the values of the two descendant nodes. The same thing happens at the right max node. The complete expression has the form
where we define RMS ai only on diagonal matrices, as a weighted root mean square of eigenvalues whose basis vectors differ only on qubit i. This is in the same spirit as Tr ai which does a regular weighted average. The expression can be simplified so that for n = 3:
All that remains is to analyze the case where Bob is honest and Alice is cheating. Though this could be analyzed using the methods presented in this section, we can exploit further symmetries of the protocols to obtain the result. In particular, the protocol with n steps and constants a 1 , . . . , a n is equivalent to the protocol with n + 1 steps and constants a 1 , . . . , a n+1 with a 1 = 1, a i+1 = a i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and Alice's and Bob's roles switched. Furthermore, if E 0 is a projector associated with the n message protocol, and E 1 the projector associated with the n + 1 step protocol, the two matrices are related by Tr a1=1 E 1 = E 0 . We also need to use the fact that Tr a1=1 commutes through all the RMS operators because it is a projector onto a subspace rather than a trace. Combining all the results, we have proven the following theorem: Theorem 5. In the protocol described in Section 2, Alice's and Bob's ability to win by cheating are upper bounded by
when n is even, and by
when n is odd.
The above formulas are valid only when a 1 , . . . , a n are chosen so that the honest probability of winning is 1/2. This is the source of the factor of 2 appearing in front of the expressions, which could be replaced by one over the honest probability of winning for more general scenarios.
In fact, the above formulas are even more general, as they apply to any choice of {E 0 , E 1 } as long as they are diagonal projectors.
5.
Choosing a 1 , . . . , a n Any choice of parameters a 1 , . . . , a n subject to the constraint ψ|E i ⊗ E i |ψ = 1 2 describes a valid quantum weak coin-flipping protocol, with bias ≤ max (α, β) − 1/2, expressed as a function of these parameters. Now we need to choose values for the parameters.
Because the expressions for α and β are complicated, we shall employ numerical minimization to find optimal values for the parameters for certain small values of n.
Fortunately, the quality of the minimization does not need to be verified. For example, it would be perfectly acceptable if rather than finding the true minimum, we only found a local minimum, or even if the outputted parameters did not constitute a minimum at all. All that is needed is for the parameters to satisfy the constraint, and produce the quoted bias when substituted into the expressions for α and β. Though the constraint can only be satisfied to the accuracy with which the parameters are specified, there are always nearby values that satisfy the constraint exactly and produce a similar bias. These values can be obtained, for example, by using the constraint to provide an analytic expression for a n .
In addition to the constraint ψ|E i ⊗ E i |ψ = 1 2 , the minimizations were carried out with the constraint α = β. For n = 3, we find α = β 0.69905 at a 1 = 0.74094, a 2 = 0.479696 and a 3 = 0.186312. Though strictly speaking we should write that there exists a protocol with n = 3 and ≤ 0.1991, for simplicity we will write = 0.199 which is understood to be correct to the given accuracy.
Continuing with the analysis of small n, we find: for n = 4 we get 0.1957, for n = 6 we get 0.1937, for n = 8 we get 0.1931, and for n = 10 we get 0.1927. For specific forms of a k as a function of k ∈ 1, . . . , n, the expressions for α and β can be computed for large values of n. A theoretically pleasant, though non-optimal choice, is a k = 1/k for n even. Recall that {E 0 , E 1 } can be described by the process whereby the qubits are examined starting from qubit n to qubit 1, and the first zero that is found determines the winner. With a k = 1/k, the probability that qubit k needs to be examined is k/n, and therefore each qubit determines the outcome with a probability of 1/n. The problem with this choice is that Bob's probability of winning given that qubit k needs to be examined keeps oscillating between 1/2 and numbers greater than 1/2, and therefore Bob has the ability to cheat more than Alice.
The values of α and β as a function of n for a k = 1/k were computed for large n. The result is that both converge towards 0.6922, or a bias of = 0.1922. The same behavior occurs with many other reasonable choices for a k as a function of k. We believe that all choices will converge in the limit of n → ∞ to a bias of 0.1922 (or higher for bad choices).
Summary
We have shown the existence of quantum weak coinflipping protocols with biases as low as 0.193 and converging to a number near 0.192 as n → ∞. Unfortunately, this appears to be the smallest bias that can be achieved by the protocol described in this paper for any number of rounds.
Many possibilities remain open. The first is that quantum weak coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias is impossible, and that the optimal bias is either 0.192 or some number below it. This would be unfortunate, but in the opinion of the author not all that improbable.
Another possibility is that there exists a different family of protocols that produces arbitrarily small bias. A third possibility is that the protocol presented in this paper has an arbitrarily small bias. This could happen either because some better choice of parameters {a k } does produce arbitrarily small bias, or because the upper bounds α and β are not tight and converge to a different value than the true bias. The last possibility could be eliminated by constructing cheating strategies with biases equal to the upper bound.
